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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to assess three major theories of international relations – neorealism, 
neoliberalism and social constructivism – for their ability to explain Russia’s nuclear weapons 
policy in the post-Cold War era. First, this research examines the development of Russia’s 
decision-making and subsequent policy regarding nuclear weapons between 1993 and present. 
It does so by looking at three major indicators of said policy during this time period: the role 
attributed to nuclear weapons according to Russia’s official military doctrine, the size (quantity) 
and strength (quality) of the Russian nuclear arsenal and the use of threatening nuclear rhetoric 
by Russian policy makers. Then, five hypotheses are put to the test, in order to assess the 
respective utility of the three mentioned theories as a model to explain the Russian policy. 
Respectively, this research examines the extent to which changes in Russia’s power position, 
its economic interdependence, its adherence to the international nuclear regime, norms 
prevailing in Russia’s society and Russia’s perception of the US had any influence on the 
direction of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. When it comes to the assessment of neorealism, 
neoliberalism and social constructivism, this research concludes that, while none of the three 
theories’ expectations are fully met, Russian nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era 
can best be explained by combining insights from both neorealism and neoliberalism. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Since early 2014, already strained relations between the West – that is, members of the EU and 
NATO, in particular the United States – and the Russian Federation have been under constant 
pressure. Tensions between the two sides increased rapidly after Russia took de facto control 
of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014. Subsequent factors leading to a further escalation of 
tensions include the apparent Russian involvement in the civil war raging in Ukraine’s Donbass 
region, the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in August 2014, and Russia’s stance 
regarding the civil war in Syria, which directly opposes that of the West.  
 Against this backdrop, the Russian president Vladimir Putin asserted in March 2015 that 
Russia had seriously considered the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of NATO 
interference with Russia’s 2014 operations in Crimea. In June that same year, Putin announced 
that Russia would increase its nuclear strike capabilities, by bringing over forty new 
intercontinental ballistic missiles into service later in 2015. Putin’s statements were 
consequently condemned by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. Stoltenberg referred 
to Putin’s comments as “nuclear sabre-rattling”, calling the comments both “destabilizing and 
dangerous” (Agence France-Presse, 2015). Ultimately, NATO responded in a more resilient 
way as well. The organization announced a thorough re-evaluation of its nuclear weapons 
strategy, hinting at the placement of more nuclear weapons on the European continent 
(MacAskill 2015). Almost twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons 
are once again on the forefront of politics between Russia and the West.    
 In the bulk of Western media, Russia’s recent nuclear rhetoric has been branded as an 
extraordinary escalation of tensions between Russia on one hand, and NATO and the United 
States on the other. Fears of Russia upping the ante by modernizing, or even reinforcing, its 
nuclear arsenal, have grown substantially. Specifically, NATO officials have voiced their 
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concern, identifying the Russian rhetoric as a signal that Russia might be lowering its threshold 
for the use of nuclear weapons in conflict situations; a decision implying a return to Cold War 
nuclear strategies (MacAskill 2015). Whether or not the foregoing is true is something up for 
debate. However, it should be clear that Russia’s nuclear weapons policy plays an important 
part in shaping the relations between Russia and the rest of the world; its relations with members 
of  NATO and the United States in particular. Keeping this in mind, two questions arise: to 
what extent did Russia’s nuclear weapons policy change in the post-Cold War era; and how can 
one explain changes in said policy?  
1.2 Scope and Significance 
As a whole, explaining state behavior lies within the realm of international relations (IR) theory. 
Accordingly, this thesis seeks to examine the utility of three theories of international relations 
as a model to explain changes in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era. 
The theories put to the test in this piece are neorealism, neoliberalism and social constructivism 
– the three leading paradigms within international relations theory at present (Wolfrum 2011). 
This thesis shows how, according to the logic of each theory, states can be expected to make 
choices regarding their nuclear weapons policy. These particular explanations are then applied 
to the case of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy, in order to see which theory best explains the 
choices Russia made in this respect. Consequently, the main research question this thesis seeks 
to answer is:  
To what extent can three leading theories of International Relations – neorealism, 
neoliberalism and social constructivism – explain the development of Russia’s nuclear weapons 
policy in the post-Cold War era? 
Providing an answer to this question is highly relevant in light of today’s international 
political environment. For many, the end of the Cold War signified the imminence of a 
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“perpetual peace” amongst the world’s great powers (Mearsheimer 2014). Put differently, “the 
end of history as such” (Fukuyama 1989), a world in which intense security competition 
between the world’s foremost powers would be a relic of the past, was about to descend upon 
mankind. As we have seen, this has regrettably not been the case, something reflected perhaps 
most prominently in the fact that both the United States and Russia still harbor thousands of 
nuclear weapons. Moreover, more states than ever before have acquired nuclear weapons over 
the past two decades, most notably Pakistan and North-Korea, regardless of multiple 
international treaties aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Status of World 
Nuclear Forces 2015). Additionally, nuclear weapons, as well as their potential carriers, have 
never been as technologically advanced as they are today. Nuclear weapons thus remain to be 
a vastly important aspect of international politics and security.    
 Examining Russia’s nuclear weapons policy through the respective lenses of 
neorealism, neoliberalism and social constructivism serves a dual purpose. Firstly, neorealism, 
neoliberalism and social constructivism each explain why countries make decisions 
surrounding nuclear weapons policy in a different way. This thesis consequently seeks to put 
the different assumptions these respective theories make regarding nuclear policy decision-
making to the test. Secondly, this thesis seeks to contribute to the scholarly debate surrounding 
the three foremost theoretical approaches to international relations, specifically with regards to 
their explanatory capability in the current, unipolar international system.   
 Some of the ideas underlying the respective explanations of neorealism, neoliberalism 
and social constructivism have been scrutinized before; yet only in relation to explaining why 
a country decides to obtain nuclear weapons in the first place. However, there is a scarcity of 
literature assessing the three theories’ predictions regarding the nuclear weapons policy of 
present nuclear weapons states; a major research gap this thesis strives to cover by placing the 
differing theoretical predictions regarding states and their nuclear strategy together in a 
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comparative framework. To summarize, this thesis seeks to resolve which of three international 
relations theories – neorealism, neoliberalism or social constructivism – best explains the 
development of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. It does so by examining the way each theory 
would predict how a country makes decisions surrounding its nuclear weapons policy; and then 
analyzing the specific case of Russia to find which of the respective theories’ expectations are 
met, and which are not.  
2 Theoretical Framework and Propositions 
2.1 Neorealism 
Neorealism, also known as structural realism, established itself as a distinct discipline in 
international relations in 1979, when Kenneth Waltz published his Theory of International 
Politics. Neorealism posits that the international system is anarchic in nature, and that this 
anarchy is what drives the rational actors operating within it – the states (Mearsheimer 2014). 
As the international system is anarchic, no one state can trust another fully. Thus, states are 
continuously embroiled in a struggle for survival (Waltz, cited in Art 2007, p. 35). However, 
when a state increases its own security, be it through increasing its own military strength or by 
cooperating with another state, this automatically decreases the security of other states. (Jervis, 
cited in Art 2007, p.90) This phenomenon, essential to neorealist thinking, is known as the 
security dilemma, and it is where the two main currents within neorealism itself, defensive 
realism and offensive realism, diverge. Whereas defensive realists assert that a state’s primary 
concern is maintaining the existing balance of power between states – avoiding the security 
dilemma at all costs – offensive realists argue instead that states are expected to continuously 
seek to maximize their share of power (Mearsheimer 2014). Either way, a state’s relative power 
position is what matters to neorealists, as this is what ultimately decides whether or not a state 
survives within the international system.       
  Neorealists generally define power as the material capabilities of a state relative to the 
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capabilities of other states; its military capabilities in particular (Ritchie 2009). It is considered 
reasonable for states to maximize their military power versus other states, as it is in their interest 
to do so if they seek to survive in the international system (Ritchie 2009). Neorealists argue 
there is no better way for a state to maximize its military power than through obtaining nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear weapons being the absolute pinnacle of military capabilities, every state 
attaining – and maintaining – a nuclear threat vastly increases its chances of survival 
(Mearsheimer 2014).           
 Thus, neorealists adhere to nuclear deterrence theory: the idea that a state’s nuclear 
weapons, thanks to their sheer destructive power, deter a potentially more powerful foe from 
attacking it with its own nuclear weapons (Cimbala 2013). Nuclear weapons as such need not 
to be actually used: their mere existence is enough to scare away any potential opponent from 
nuclear attack (Sagan 1996). After all, which rational-thinking nuclear weapons state would 
attack another nuclear weapons state, knowing that assured retaliation – and potential mutual 
destruction – were to follow? (Jervis 1989) It is therefore not a surprise that some neorealists 
argue that if every single state on earth were to possess nuclear weapons, this would lead to an 
incredibly stable balance of power spanning across the globe (Waltz 1981).   
 Such thinking exposes a flaw inherent to the state-centric approach of neorealism. It 
assumes states are rational actors, and thus fails to account for potential decisions made by 
world leaders or non-state actors not thinking according to the ‘rules’ of the system. 
Additionally, neorealism treats states as so-called ‘black boxes: it does not detail domestic 
factors potentially influencing state behavior – in this case a state’s nuclear weapons policy. If 
these factors prove to be of importance in Russia’s decision-making regarding its nuclear 
weapons policy, this seriously dents neorealism’s potential in explaining said policy. 
 Neorealism foresees that if the balance of relative military capabilities between states is 
upset in favor of one particular actor – or group of actors – other states in the system will 
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automatically seek to counterbalance this. Thus, whenever a state acquires nuclear weapons, its 
rival states should do so too (Hymans 2006). This is what happened during the early stages of 
the Cold War: as soon as it became evident the United States had acquired nuclear weapons, 
the Soviet Union stepped up its own nuclear weapons program (Sagan 1996). Neorealist 
thinking in this respect fails to account for the fact that many countries capable of producing 
nuclear weapons have chosen not to do so, both in the present and in the past (Hymans 2006). 
While thus certainly not flawless in explaining nuclear proliferation, the neorealist predictive 
model may still be useful in explaining the nuclear weapons policy of a state already owning 
nuclear weapons. Neorealism holds that if the relative power position of a nuclear weapons 
state changes, this should be reflected in its nuclear weapons policy. If said state’s relative share 
of world power declines, nuclear weapons should become more preeminent in its national 
security strategy; meaning that the size and strength of its nuclear arsenal should increase, its 
government should make more nuclear threats and its threshold for using nuclear weapons 
should be lowered. Vice versa, if a state’s relative share of world power rises, nuclear weapons 
should become less important to its national security strategy. Thus: 
H1: A decline in Russia’s relative share of world power should be followed by an increase in 
the strength and size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, the lowering of its threshold for using 
nuclear weapons and an increase in Russian nuclear threat-making; conversely, an increase in 
Russia’s relative share of world power should lead to a decrease in the size and strength of its 
nuclear arsenal, a higher threshold for using nuclear weapons and a decrease in Russian nuclear 
threat-making. 
2.2 Neoliberalism 
The second model this thesis examines for its explanatory capability of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy, neoliberalism, was developed in response to the preeminence of the neorealist 
paradigm within international relations theory. Neoliberalism is not one clearly definable 
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school of thought; under its wings lie a score of heterogeneous ideas and theories, attributable 
to a number of different scholars. These theories however share the idea that states should be 
most concerned with absolute gains, rather than relative gains to other states, thus differing 
substantially from neorealism (where a state’s relative power position within the system is of 
importance). Neoliberalism agrees with neorealism to the extent that the international system, 
with states as its main actor, is anarchic, and that any form of hierarchy within this system 
cannot be enforced. However, neoliberals postulate that this anarchic nature is of less 
importance than neorealists think, and that – even in an anarchic system in which states are not 
able to fully trust each other – cooperation between states can materialize through the inception 
of certain norms, institutions and regimes (Keohane 1984).     
 By binding states together in such organizations and ideas, states are enabled to 
communicate more clearly with one another regarding sensitive issues. This subsequently leads 
to increased trust amongst these states. And, where there is sustained trust amongst states, peace 
is likely to follow, eventually removing the need for security competition between them (and 
thus diminishing the relevance of military strength in international relations) (Keohane 1984). 
This in essence forms the basic premise of neoliberal thought in international relations. In order 
to translate this premise into predictions regarding Russia’s nuclear weapons policy, this thesis 
looks into two significant ideas within the neoliberal school of thought.   
 First, the idea of complex interdependence. This idea holds that international relations 
are shaped by (economic) interdependence between states. Scholars adhering to this principle 
argue that whenever the mutual economic dependence between two states increases, their 
reliance on military power can be expected to decrease (Keohane 1977). Economic 
interdependence between states makes these states more likely to cooperate, instead of to 
compete with each other (Keohane 1977). Put differently, as a state’s (economic) interests 
become entangled with those of other states, this automatically lessens the incentive of the states 
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involved to engage in combat with each other. After all, which state would seek to harm its 
own, economic interests? When translated into a possible explanation for Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy, complex interdependence provides us with the ensuing hypothesis: 
H2: The greater the extent of Russia’s economic dependence on other states, the more Russia 
should decide to decrease the strength and size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, to increase its 
threshold for using nuclear weapons and to make less nuclear threats versus other countries. 
 The second idea from which a neoliberal hypothesis regarding Russia’s nuclear weapons 
policy can be derived is regime theory. Regime theory holds that international institutions – or 
regimes – play a crucial role in mitigating anarchy and assisting cooperation between states. 
Neoliberals describe institutions more extensively as “persistent and connected sets of rules 
(formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” 
of states (Keohane 1988). International regimes come in different shapes and sizes, yet 
international institutions are central to their existence. For example, the international regime of 
development aid is furthered by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
An international nuclear regime exist too, chiefly in the form of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (or NPT). The NPT is the world’s only binding treaty aimed 
at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and its related technology and furthering the goal 
of achieving nuclear disarmament (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2015). The 
international system’s nuclear regime is complemented by regulatory institutions such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as by other agreements between states 
(such as various nuclear-weapons-free-zones and bi- and multilateral arms reduction treaties). 
The significance of international regimes in shaping a country’s policy – as posited by 
neoliberal thinking – should thus become evident too when analyzing Russia’s nuclear weapons 
policy. This leaves us with the following hypothesis: 
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H3: As Russia’s envelopment in the international nuclear regime becomes more extensive, the 
strength and size of its nuclear weapons arsenal should decrease, its threshold for using nuclear 
weapons should increase and the less it should make nuclear threats versus other states. 
Although this hypothesis may seem like an obvious truth, this does not necessarily have to be 
the case. After all, it is very much possible for Russia to be part of various arms reduction 
treaties and other multilateral agreements regarding nuclear weapons, while not living up to the 
standards of these agreements. Principally, the above hypothesis can only be validated if Russia 
truly adheres to the arrangements within these arms control treaties, as one would consider to 
be in line with the international nuclear regime as a whole. One should keep in mind that 
Russia’s compliance with the various arms control treaties it signed can only be assessed to a 
certain extent. After all, whether or not Russia fulfills its obligations under these treaties can be 
assessed only by looking at estimates regarding the size and strength of Russia’s nuclear 
arsenal. Estimates are used since data of actual Russian nuclear stockpiles throughout the years 
are impossible to attain within the scope of this research. This research thus attempts to assess 
Russia’s compliance based on the information available to it, in this case estimates. 
2.3 Constructivism 
The third and final model this thesis assesses is constructivism. Constructivism is considered 
to be one of the most complex theories of international relations. Constructivists believe that 
political actors themselves construct international relations out of their own ideas about how 
these relations should be shaped – instead of these being predetermined by the anarchic 
structure of the international system, as neorealists and neoliberalists would argue. That is to 
say, social practice and interaction, both between states as well as occurring within states 
themselves, is what builds (or ‘constructs’) international relations. As social practice and 
interaction change over time, so do state interests, these interests continuously being molded 
into different shapes and forms.  “Constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, 
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as becoming, rather than being” (Adler 2005).       
 To elaborate: “The things states do, their interests, and the structures within which they 
operate are constructed by social norms and ideas, instead of objectives, or material conditions” 
(Van Wyk et al. 2007). This notion directly opposes a key tenet of both neorealism and 
neoliberalism, i.e. that states, acting within the anarchy that is the international system, are 
always on the hunt for material gain – and that this consequently shapes the way a state interacts 
with other states. Alexander Wendt, who laid the theoretical foundation for constructivism, 
argues that even the idea of the international system being anarchic is a construct, created by 
the nation-states acting within this system (Wendt 1992). International relations according to 
constructivists are thus not set and stone, as they are being influenced continuously by 
developments occurring on two different levels, the internal level on one hand and the external 
level on the other (Ferrero 2014).        
 The internal level revolves around a state’s norms and values, and their subsequent 
influence on the way a state views the world around it. Each state has a unique set of norms 
important to it, these being defined by internal characteristics including a state’s history, its 
culture, and social practice. These norms makes states think, and accordingly behave, 
differently than other states in the international system. This influence can be observed in the 
nuclear weapons policy of other countries. Japan for example is a state considered to be 
paranuclear: it is perfectly capable to quickly produce nuclear weapons, without actually having 
done so (Panofsky 2007). Having suffered two devastating nuclear attacks – the only country 
in the world to do so – the norm prevailing in Japan is that nuclear weapons, even the 
development thereof, are taboo (Burr 2015). Another ‘nuclear norm’ is that of the non-use of 
nuclear weapons. Following 1945, the United States for instance has developed and produced 
numerous nuclear weapons; yet never used these weapons in combat again. If similar norms are 
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prevalent in Russia – or become more widespread – these can be expected to be reflected in its 
nuclear weapons policy:  
H4: If certain norms, such as the non-use of nuclear weapons, become more predominant in the 
Russian society, this should be reflected in Russia’s decision-making surrounding its nuclear 
weapons policy. 
The external level then consists of the world outside the state itself, that is, the 
international state system as a whole (Ferrero 2014). Not only social interactions within states, 
as outlined above, but also interactions between states shape state behavior and, consequently, 
international politics. Suppose the relationship between the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Both possess vast material wealth and nuclear weapons, but due to their social 
relations the two nations do not see each other as a threat. How different it becomes when one 
looks at the threat the United States perceives North Korea to be. Due to the different (historical) 
social relationships the U.S. has with these countries, the U.S. reasonably reacts differently to 
the same action performed by different states. “Five-hundred British nuclear  weapons  are  less  
threatening  to  the  United  States  than five North Korean nuclear weapons” (Wendt, 1995). 
According to Alexander Wendt, who first applied the constructivist argument to the systemic 
level, whether a state views another as adversarial or as cooperative depends on the construction 
of this state’s understanding of the international system and of each state (Ferrero 2014). The 
final hypothesis in this research stems from this line of thinking. A state’s behavior, according 
to constructivism, should be influenced by the way  this state perceives other states. Following 
this, Russia’s nuclear weapons policy should be influenced by the way Russia views other 
nuclear weapons states, the United States in particular. This is because the United States, next 
to Russia, is by far the largest nuclear weapons state in the world. 
H5: When Russia’s perception of the United States changes for the better, this should lead to a 
decrease in the strength and size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, an increase in its threshold for 
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using nuclear weapons and a decrease in the making of nuclear threats against other countries. 
Similarly, when Russia’s perception of the US changes for the worse, the opposite should occur: 
Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal should face a decrease in size and strength, its nuclear 
threshold should be lowered and it should make more nuclear threats against other states.  
3 Methodology and Data Collection 
3.1 Indicators and corresponding sources 
This thesis consists of two major components. The first part examines Russia’s nuclear weapons 
policy in the post-Cold War era, in order to establish that change in said policy has indeed 
occurred. The second part then consists of testing the hypotheses, as expressed in the foregoing 
part, against changes in the Russian policy. This thesis relies on the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative data. Its main research focus lies on examining fluctuations in Russia’s policy 
regarding nuclear weapons, and then finding the extent to which these changes can be attributed 
to shifts in any factors important to the three theories and their respective predictions. This 
research examines Russia’s nuclear weapons policy from the moment the constitution of the 
Russian Federation was adopted in December 1993 until present. This time frame is chosen in 
order to omit the unsettled and disorderly state of Russian affairs directly following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The dependent variable in this research is the 
progression of Russia’s policy regarding nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era. Henceforth, 
this concept shall plainly be referred to as Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. There are three 
potential directions which Russia’s nuclear weapons policy can take: nuclear weapons can 
become less important to Russia’s national security strategy, they can become more important, 
or their importance to Russia’s national security strategy stays the same.   
 The three prime indicators used to determine the direction of Russia’s policy are (1) the 
role given to nuclear weapons in Russia’s official military doctrine, (2) the size and strength of 
Russia’s nuclear arsenal, and (3) nuclear threats made by Russian government officials. Three 
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indicators are chosen, so as to gain as extensive insight as possible into Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy. For instance, merely looking into Russian military doctrine (established at 
fixed points in time) would not reflect short term changes in the attitude of Russian policy 
makers towards nuclear weapons and the use thereof. Such changes can be better understood 
by looking at official government statements regarding nuclear weapons, as well as by looking 
at the continuous development of the size and strength of the Russian nuclear weapons arsenal. 
Nevertheless, omitting official policy documents regarding Russia’s military doctrine 
altogether would be a major flaw in itself: these documents provide insight in the strategic 
outlook Russian policymakers had at the time of writing these documents, and thus provide 
good insight in the Russian nuclear weapons policy as a whole. I expect all three indicators to 
have experienced at least some kind of change over time in the post-Cold War era, thus 
providing an all=inclusive image of the development of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. 
 Sources regarding the three indicators employed in this research are as follows. The role 
nuclear weapons play in Russia’s military doctrine (1) is examined by looking chiefly into the 
official military doctrine of the Russian Federation, as laid out in three successive government 
documents regarding military strategy1: 
 The Basic Provision of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (1993)    
(Source: Federation of American Scientists) 
 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2000) 
(Source: Arms Control Association)     
 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010) 
(Source: The School of Russian and Asian Studies) 
                                                          
1 In December 2014, Russia’s military doctrine was updated extensively and subsequently re-issued. The update 
did not constitute any subtantial changes to the 2010 Doctrine regarding its provisions on nuclear weapons 
policy, hence examining the 2014 version is omitted from this research altogether. 
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These documents cover the likely character of any future war involving Russia, the preparations 
of the Russian military for such a conflict and the methods of waging it. Above all, these 
documents list specific provisions regarding the use and (future) development of Russia’s 
nuclear weapons arsenal. Secondly, in order to deepen understanding of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons doctrine, this thesis also looks into documents providing more of a comprehensive 
view of Russia’s outlooks on national security: 
 The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000) 
(Source: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 Russia's National Security Strategy (2009) 
(Source: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
Together, these five documents provide a broad impression of Russian strategic nuclear 
weapons policy under three differing presidents, respectively Boris Jeltsin, Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitri Medvedev.           
 Then, in order to assess the size (quantity) and strength (quality) of the Russian nuclear 
inventory (2) this research looks into estimates regarding the size, as well as in-depth reports 
about the quality and development of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. In doing so, it uses aggregate 
data and reports as provided by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert Norris of the Federation of 
American Scientists; the world’s leading experts in estimating the size of global nuclear 
weapons stockpiles (World Nuclear Weapon Stockpile 2015). Again, estimates are used since, 
especially over the past decade, definite figures regarding Russia’s nuclear arsenal are 
unavailable to this research. Lastly, in order to analyze the use of threatening nuclear rhetoric 
by Russian policy makers (3), this research makes use of aggregate data on the making of 
credible nuclear threats; as expressed by policy makers of nuclear weapons states between 1977 
and 2010. The dataset employed by this research defines a credible nuclear threat as: 
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1. “Observable actions taken, such as increasing nuclear alert levels, the flight- testing of 
nuclear-capable missiles, or the repositioning of significant military forces capable of 
employing nuclear weapons to demonstrate resolve during a crisis or in warfare” (Black 
2010). 
2.  “Statements (whether made in public or transmitted through private channels and 
subsequently disclosed) by high-ranking government officials or their representatives 
during a crisis or in warfare expressing or indicating a willingness to use nuclear 
weapons in defense of national interests (Black 2010).  
Such explicit threats are not made often, however they persist, even following the end of the 
Cold War. As they are generally not expressed often, nuclear threats can be regarded a clear 
indicator of the importance of nuclear weapons to a state’s national security strategy. 
3.2 Predictions and how to assess them 
The fluctuations in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy, as found by analyzing the three indicators, 
are used to empirically test the predictions of neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. To 
begin with, the neorealist hypothesis H1 is tested by examining Russia’s relative share of world 
power in the post-Cold War era, especially in the years leading up to important changes in 
Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. This assessment is made by analyzing Russian state power in 
terms of both economic (latent) power and military power. The first is measured by looking 
into some of the IMF’s basic indicators of economic power, such as real GDP, inflation and the 
number of people in Russia living below the poverty threshold. The latter is analyzed by looking 
into the general state of the Russian military following the end of the Cold War. 
 The predictions of neoliberalism, H2 and H3, are put to the test in two distinct ways. H2 
is tested by gauging the extent of Russia’s economic interdependence. This is done by looking 
into two factors, put forward by the IMF as strong indicators of interdependence: international 
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trade (the amount of trade, both import and export, between a state and other states) and 
financial flows between a state and others (Streeten 2001). An increase in these two indicators 
for Russia signify an increase in its economic interdependence. Figures on both indicators for 
Russia are available online via the IMF and the World Bank. H3 is tested by analyzing Russia’s 
involvement in – and adherence to – nuclear arms reduction treaties throughout the post-Cold 
War period. Specifically, Russia’s devotion to nuclear regimes is assessed by looking into four 
significant nuclear arms (reduction) treaties signed and/or ratified by the Russian Federation 
since 1993, and Russia’s compliance regarding them: 
 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I, signed between the Soviet Union and the 
United States in 1991) 
 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, signed between Russia and the United 
States in 2002) 
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996) 
 New START Treaty (signed between the Russian Federation and the US in 2010) 
Finally, this research tests the two hypotheses derived from constructivism. Both 
hypotheses are tested by examining public opinion in Russia. H4 to start with, regarding 
Russia’s normative approach to nuclear weapons, is tested by examining the general public’s 
opinion in Russia regarding nuclear weapons. The data used by this research is derived from 
polls regarding public opinion on nuclear weapons in Russia, undertaken by a number of 
independent think tanks. If the way nuclear weapons are perceived in Russia has changed over 
the past two decades, constructivism holds that this should be reflected accordingly in Russia’s 
nuclear weapons policy. The same goes for H5. This hypothesis is tested by comparing changes 
in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy to changes in the Russian general public’s opinion of the 
United States. This is done by examining quantitative date regarding public opinion of the 
United States in Russia, as collected by the U.S. think tank Pew Research Center over the past 
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two decades (Pew Research Center 2015).       
 In the assessment of both H4 and H5, public opinion is used as a proxy of the thought-
process surrounding elite decision-making on nuclear weapons. As true insight in this process 
is impossible to attain within the constrictions of this research, public opinion is used instead. 
Public opinion serves as an indicator of the social values and convictions of the Russian people. 
As policy makers need to take this convictions into account – and are highly likely to have 
similar convictions themselves - public opinion is a good alternative indicator of the reasoning 
behind Russia’s elite decision-making regarding nuclear weapons. 
4 The Evolution of Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Policy 
4.1 Using Nuclear Weapons according to Russian Policy Documents 
Before testing the hypotheses set out before, it is necessary to assess the development of 
Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons policy over the time frame set out for this research. As 
mentioned earlier, the first indicator of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy this research employs 
is the specific role nuclear weapons play in Russia’s official military doctrine. Since the end of 
the Cold War, Russia has issued three official military doctrines, each detailing Russia’s 
considerations regarding the use of its nuclear weapons arsenal.     
 The Russian Federation’s first-ever official military doctrine, published in 1993, in 
many ways signified a break from the past. One way this becomes evident is by looking at the 
document’s provisions regarding the use of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal. In 1982 Leonid 
Brezhnev, then-leader of the Soviet Union, made the official pledge not to use nuclear weapons 
as a way of waging war; unless the Soviet Union were to be attacked by an adversary using 
nuclear weapons first. Despite vastly rising nuclear weapons stockpiles, this no-first-use pledge 
formed the basis of the Soviet Union’s stance regarding nuclear weapons in the final ten years 
of its existence (source). In the 1993 Military Doctrine, Russian officials formally abandoned 
Brezhnev’s guarantee. The first provision given by the document is that Russia would 
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exclusively consider the use of nuclear weapons in case of global warfare (The Russian 
Federation Security Council 1993). Furthermore, the document lists three cases which would 
give Russia the right to use nuclear weapons. The first case is not that remarkable: as the Soviet 
Union, Russia would be incentivized to use its nuclear weapons in case of an enemy nuclear 
attack against it or its allies (The Russian Federation Security Council 1993). The other two 
cases in which Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons however are more 
interesting. The 1993 document states that the Russian Federation would be entitled to make 
use of nuclear weapons, even against certain non-nuclear weapons states, in case of global war 
leading to: 
“a) An armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, other troops, 
or its allies by any state which is connected by an alliance agreement with a state that does 
possess nuclear weapons; 
 b) joint actions by such a state with a state possessing nuclear weapons in the carrying out or 
in support of any invasion or armed attack upon the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed 
Forces, other troops, or its allies” (The Russian Federation Security Council 1993). 
In essence, these two provisions send a clear signal to non-nuclear weapons states allied with a 
nuclear weapons state (such as all states party to NATO) not to interfere with Russia’s internal 
affairs. Russia’s nuclear weapons strategy according to its first-ever military doctrine thus can 
be regarded a classic example of dissuasive military strategy; “bolstering deterrence in a period 
of weakness for Russia’s conventional military” (Trenin 2005).    
 The two subsequent doctrinal policy documents appropriated by the Russian legislation, 
both issued in 2000, confirmed Russia’s inclination to use nuclear weapons first during conflict. 
The 2000 Military Doctrine expands on the provisions established in the 1993 Doctrine, albeit 
does so in rather ambiguous terms. It states that Russia: 
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“(…) reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and 
other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response 
to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national 
security of the Russian Federation” (Arms Control Association 2000). 
From this statement one can derive that Russia in its 2000 Military Doctrine reserved the right 
to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of all ‘weapons of mass destruction’, not just the 
use of nuclear weapons per se. The 2000 Doctrine however does not define what a situation 
‘critical to national security’, one permitting the deployment of nuclear weapons, actually 
entails. Similar obscurity is found when analyzing Russia’s 2000 National Security Concept, 
which lists the notion that Russia would employ: 
“(…) all the manpower and resources available to it, including nuclear weapons, in the event 
of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have 
been exhausted or proven inefficient” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000). 
It remains unclear when exactly it is determined for ‘measures of resolving the crisis situation’ 
to be ineffective. As this is nowhere specified in the document, it remains uncertain under what 
circumstances exactly Russia would opt to use nuclear weapons.     
 Both documents are not merely an elaboration on the nuclear strategy outlined in 1993, 
owing to one specific provision in particular, which points to a significant lowering of Russia’s 
nuclear threshold. The 2000 Doctrine distinctly notes that nuclear weapons may be employed 
by the Russian Federation first during a war, by means of “de-escalating armed conflict” (Arms 
Control Association 2000). This notion is explained further by two of the main scholarly 
contributors to studies surrounding Russia’s nuclear weapons strategy, first by the Russian 
military strategist Yury E. Fedorov: 
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“(…) Russian military planners see limited use of nuclear weapons – either tactical or 
strategic – as the only way to challenge an enemy by an awful dilemma: either to stop military 
operations and recognize defeat, or to respond by a nuclear strike, which would be followed by 
an escalation up to strategic nuclear exchange with catastrophic consequences for all. This tactic 
is called “de-escalation of armed conﬂict” by a limited ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons. In 
particular, it presumes ‘demonstrative strikes’ made by a few strategic weapons against targets 
located in unpopulated areas in the deep rear of the enemy, or a few strikes at the seat of war 
by tactical nuclear weapons” (Fedorov 2010). 
A second elaboration is offered by non-proliferation expert Nikolai Sokov: 
“The [2000 Military] doctrine introduced the notion of de-escalation—a strategy 
envisioning the threat of a limited nuclear strike that would force an opponent to accept a return 
to the status quo ante. Such a threat is envisioned as deterring the United States and its allies 
from involvement in conflicts in which Russia has an important stake, and in this sense is 
essentially defensive. Yet, to be effective, such a threat also must be credible. To that end, all 
large-scale military exercises that Russia conducted beginning in 2000 featured simulations of 
limited nuclear strikes” (Sokov 2014). 
The concept of using nuclear weapons for de-escalating warfare is complemented by 
what is detailed in the 2000 National Security Concept, namely that Russia no longer 
exclusively associates the use of nuclear weapons with global warfare, but also with the more 
limited concept of regional warfare (Sokov 2003). The move from using strategic nuclear 
weapons as a ‘last resort option’ in global warfare to using tactical nuclear weapons as a means 
of winning (or ‘de-escalating’) a more limited regional war constitutes a significant lowering 
of Russia’s threshold to use nuclear weapons. After all, starting a nuclear war on the strategic 
level is an incredibly difficult decision to make: it brings along massive destruction, as well as 
the likelihood of massive retaliation from the side of the enemy. To engage in tactical nuclear 
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warfare on the other hand is a much easier decision to make: it too involves massive destruction, 
yet on a much smaller scale. Something else to consider, in light of the nuclear threshold, is that 
using nuclear weapons on the tactical level subsequently brings along another danger: that of 
quick escalation of nuclear warfare from the tactical to the strategic level (Patchen 1988). 
All things considered, the 2000 Military Doctrine and accompanying  constitute a significant 
lowering of the threshold for Russia to use nuclear weapons; moving from the use of strategic 
nuclear weapons as a ‘last resort option’ to the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a means of 
winning (or ‘de-escalating’) a limited war.      
 Finally, in Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine the role assigned to nuclear weapons is 
reduced slightly, despite expectations to the contrary (Sokov 2010). In 2009, a spokesman for 
the body drafting Russia’s new military doctrine officially stated that Russia would consider 
using “nuclear weapons to counter conventional aggression not only in large-scale wars, but 
also in regional and even local wars. (…) In situations critical for national security we do not 
rule out the possibility of a preventive nuclear strike” (Patrushev 2009). Such strong language 
did not make it into the final document. In fact, any reference to the scale of warfare was omitted 
from the 2010 Doctrine, which reads: 
“Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction against it and its allies, as well as an aggression against the 
Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons if the very existence of the state is 
under threat" (The School of Russian and Asian Studies 2010). 
The criterion that the very existence of Russia as a state needs to be threatened before it 
considers using its nuclear weapons arsenal seems to point to a narrowing scope for using 
nuclear weapons, and thus a higher nuclear threshold for Russia. However, on the other hand, 
Russia’s nuclear threshold remains to be the lowest in the world.    
 To summarize, since the end of the Cold War the role attributed to nuclear weapons in 
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Russia’s official military doctrine has generally become more substantial. Whereas Russia in 
1993 considered the use of nuclear weapons as a means of last resort, focusing exclusively on 
strategic nuclear warfare, in 2000 Russia introduced the concept of using tactical nuclear 
weapons as a means of winning a limited war, an idea reconfirmed by the 2010 doctrine.  
4.2 Assessing the Size and Strength of Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal 
Besides the role attributed to nuclear weapons, a second indicator of Russia’s nuclear weapons 
policy is Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal itself, more specifically, its respective size (quantity) 
and strength (quality). First, let us study the estimated size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal 
throughout the post-Cold War era. In general, data regarding the size of nuclear arsenals 
throughout the world differentiates between three different categories of nuclear warheads, 
sorted by level of readiness (Arms Control Association 2015): 
 Deployed (active service): fully operational warheads, available for immediate use. 
These weapons are at all times directly connected to a delivery system, such as an 
ICBM, a SLBM or a designated heavy bomber. 
 Stockpiled (active service): fully operational warheads, which are kept in storage. These 
weapons are assigned for potential use on military delivery vehicles, and are available 
for direct deployment within several minutes to hours. 
 Retired (inactive reserve): nuclear warheads no longer in operational condition, without 
immediately available delivery systems. These weapons remain intact while awaiting 
dismantlement, and could theoretically be made ready for use if needed. 
This research focuses mainly on the estimated total amount of nuclear warheads Russia has had 
in active service throughout the post-Cold War era, as clear figures on the exact amount of 
retired nuclear warheads in Russia’s arsenal are not available for every year. Figure 1 illustrates 
the progression of the size of Russia’s active nuclear weapons arsenal in the post-Cold War era. 
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As figure 1 shows, the estimated size of Russia’s active nuclear weapons arsenal – operational 
warheads either deployed or stockpiled – has continuously declined since 1993; with the 
exception of 2015. Whereas Russia in 1993 had 24,403 fully operational nuclear warheads at 
its disposal, this number had declined to 4,300 by 2014, before rising again to an estimated 
4,500 nuclear warheads at active disposal in early 2015. Overall, since 1993, the active Russian 
nuclear weapons arsenal has declined by over 81 percent. However, one should take note of the 
fact that his development has slowed significantly since the end of 2004: between 1993 and 
2004, Russia’s active nuclear weapons arsenal declined by just over 67 percent, with an absolute 
decline of 16,365 nuclear warheads. Between 2004 and 2015, its active nuclear stockpile had 
decreased further by ‘only’ 44 percent, amounting to an additional absolute decline of 3,538. 
Also, since 2012, we can observe there has been no nominal decline in the amount of active 
nuclear warheads owned by the Russian Federation.     
 Credible estimates regarding Russia’s reserve nuclear weapons arsenal, those warheads 
awaiting dismantlement, are available from 2007 and onwards. Up until that year, estimates of 
the total amount of weapons awaiting dismantlement vary greatly per year, sometimes ending 
up much higher or lower than the year before.2 Starting in 2007, Kristensen and Norris offer 
reliable data pertaining to their estimates of Russia’s inactive stockpile. As such, estimates 
regarding Russia’s reserve arsenal from this year onwards can be deemed sufficiently reliable 
for use in this research. Figure 2 lists yearly estimates for the amount of nuclear warheads in 
Russia’s inactive reserve arsenal since 2007. Here too, Russia’s commitment to nuclear 
disarmament is visible. Between 2007 and 2015 Russia dismantled an estimated 6,100 nuclear 
warheads.  
                                                          
2 This became clear when studying the yearly reports, and additional comments, on the size and strength of 
Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal by Kristensen and Norris since 1999. After 2007, these scholars have obtained 
much more reliable data regarding these figures, derived from, amongst other things, statistics from various arms 
control treaties. 
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This decline was most significant between 2009 and 2013, when Russia dismantled 4,150 of its 
inoperative warheads. We can safely assume this decline to be a continuation from Russian 
disarmament efforts during the 1990s and early 2000s. After all, Russia’s active nuclear 
weapons stockpile decreased vastly during these years, and these weapons were first moved 
into its inactive nuclear arsenal before being dismantled (Kristensen 2015). Thus, generally 
speaking, the size of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal has become considerably smaller since 
the 1990s, a continuous development which lasted up until early 2015; a year marking the first 
increase in Russia’s active nuclear weapons arsenal compared to the preceding year since 1986 
(when the Soviet nuclear arsenal peaked at the amount of 40,159 active nuclear warheads) 
(Kristensen 2015). Additionally, we can derive that the decline in both Russia’s active and 
inactive nuclear warhead inventory has slowed down considerably over the years, both in terms 
of absolute and relative numbers.       
 Second, in order to fully understand the dimensions of Russia’s nuclear weapons 
arsenal, its particular strength must be assessed as well. This research employs an assessment 
scheme of nuclear strength first suggested by theoretical physicist Sydney D. Drell, which uses 
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Figure 2: Estimated Russian Inactive Nuclear Warhead Inventory 
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the aggregate number of strategic nuclear launch systems a state owns (SLBMs, ICBMs and 
primary assigned aircrafts) and the maximum amount of warheads these systems can deliver 
(Sakharov 1983). The resulting quantitative assessment is reinforced by qualitative information 
regarding improvements made to Russia’s nuclear launchers and their capabilities over time. 
The way the number of strategic nuclear launchers in Russian hands developed throughout the 
post-Cold War era can be observed in figure 3. Subsequently, figure 4 displays the total nuclear 
warhead capacity of these systems per year since 1993. 
 
 
 
Source: Natural Resources Defense Council 2015; Kristensen 2015 
Source: Natural Resources Defense Council 2015; Kristensen 2015 
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The information provided by a quantitative assessment of Russia’s nuclear strength provides us 
with three particular notions, which together paint the image of a general decline in Russia’s 
nuclear strength in the post-Cold War era. 
 Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities have generally declined since 1993. This is 
particularly noticeable when looking at the declining amount of both ICMB and SLBM 
systems over time, as well as that of the warheads associated with them. 
 Most of this decline took place between 2001 and 2010 
 Since 2010, Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities in terms of warheads have increased, 
and the decline in terms of launchers leveled off completely. 
On the other hand, an assessment of Russia’s nuclear strength in qualitative term 
augments the image painted above. In the early 1990s, Russia continued a process already 
underway in the Soviet Union during the 1980s; the process of disbanding what it 
considered excessive amounts of strategic nuclear launchers. This can be traced back in the 
graphs above; in 1994 and 1995, the total amount of strategic warheads Russia could deliver 
declined by over 1,400, a move which was already scheduled to happen under Soviet rule. 
We can observe that following this scheduled move, between 1996 and 2000, the amount 
of deployed strategic nuclear warhead capacity discarded by Russia already becomes 
significantly lower. In this specific time period, only the amount of Russian SLBMs and 
their associated warhead capacity dropped considerably. This is owed to the 
decommissioning of three aging Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarines, which were 
approaching the end of their service life (Podvig 2011). While Russia was dismantling parts 
of its swiftly aging nuclear arsenal, which it inherited from the Soviet Union, another 
development took place. The Russian general staff in the late 1990s laid out general 
directions for vastly modernizing Russia’s deployed strategic nuclear weapon launchers 
(Podvig 2011).         
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 These directions were not put into action until the 2000s. Between 2000 and 2010, 
Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities again declined in numbers, even more than in the 
1990s. On the one hand, this is owed to Russia abiding to the rules laid out in the START I 
treaty it signed with the US. The treaty put substantial restrictions on the total number of 
strategic nuclear missile launchers Russia was permitted to deploy (NTI 2011). On the 
other, even after dropping below START I mandated limits, Russia continued to reduce its 
strategic nuclear capabilities.       
 However, there is more to the strength of Russia’s nuclear arsenal than mere numbers. 
The strength (or quality) of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is also defined by the state of its 
launchers. In the late 1990s, Russia made a start with implementing the directives for 
modernization of its strategic nuclear launchers it laid out in the late 1990s. While facing a 
decline in quantity, Russia intended to significantly upgrade the quality of its nuclear launch 
capabilities. It did so, yet only to a small extent. Russian modernization efforts started off 
well. From 1999 until 2002 in particular, Russia decommissioned more and more old and 
run-down Soviet nuclear launchers, while simultaneously replacing a number of its ICMBs 
with the newly-developed RT-2PM2 Topol-M missile system. It furthermore started the 
long-term upgrade of two of its existing ballistic missile submarines and their 
accompanying SLBMs, and invested billions of rubles into research and development 
programs (Kristensen 2015). However, over time, the Russian commitment to 
modernization seemed to fade. Between 2003 and 2007, the progress of Russia’s 
modernization programs stalled (Podvig 2011). As funding towards modernization efforts 
was reduced considerably, this led to the service lives of nuclear missiles inherited from the 
Soviet Union being extended by factors of two to even three (Miasnikov 2015).
 Between 2007 and early 2010, no additional new ICMBs and SLBMs came into Russian 
service; while the total number of nuclear launchers in active Russian service continued to 
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decline. However, in 2008 Russia reinvigorated its commitment to the modernization of its 
strategic nuclear capabilities, announcing the allocation of more resources to its nuclear 
forces than ever before (Podvig 2011). Then, in 2010, the Russian government announced 
additional research and development programs, as well once more expressing its desire to 
update and recapitalize its entire arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, 
in order to counter the retirement of its aging Soviet-era nuclear capabilities (NTI 2015a). 
Additionally, that same year, a new Russian ICBM came into service, the state of the art 
RS-24 Yars, capable of carrying up to ten nuclear warheads and evading the vast majority 
of existing anti-ballistic missile systems (NTI 2015a). This revival of Russian nuclear 
strength continues until today. In 2013, a new SLBM was employed by Russia, marking the 
start of the full modernization of Russia’s SLBM arsenal. In 2014, Russia began to deploy 
upgraded versions of its two main nuclear bombers, the Tupolev TU-160M and TU-95MS. 
Subsequently, in 2015, the Russian military announced that yet another new Russian ICBM, 
the RS-28, would become operational from 2016. By comparison: the only ICBM currently 
deployed by the United States entered service in 1970 (George C. Marshall Institute 2015).
 Thus, when qualitatively assessing the strength of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, it becomes 
clear that a decrease in the amount of strategic nuclear weapons does not necessarily mean 
a reduction in its nuclear strength. All things considered, this thesis argues first that during 
the 1990s Russian nuclear weapons strength declined: the amount of strategic nuclear 
launchers and warheads deployed by Russia over this time period declined vastly, with no 
significant modernization programmes being underway whatsoever. Secondly, in the early 
2000s (2000 up until roughly 2003) Russia’s nuclear weapons strength increased: while 
continuing to disband its aging Soviet nuclear heritance, the Russian government invested 
in the development of new and the refurbishing of its old strategic nuclear warheads and 
launchers. Thirdly, approximately between 2003 and early 2008, the strength of Russia’s 
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nuclear weapons arsenal decreased again: Russia continued dismantling its old strategic 
nuclear weapons and launchers, while spending less on its nuclear modernization. Finally, 
from 2008 onwards Russia’s nuclear strength has increased significantly. Not only has 
Russia truly dedicated itself to the modernization of its strategic nuclear weapon 
capabilities, its strategic launcher capacity has increased as well. Additionally, since 2010, 
the decline in the total amount of warheads Russia could conceivably deliver levelled off. 
 4.3 Expressing Nuclear Threats: All but Common?  
The third and final indicator of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy this thesis employs is the 
making of nuclear threats by Russian government officials. Between 1993 and 2015, 
representatives of the Russian government have made a total of five distinct statements 
expressing a willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of national interest; all against 
NATO or one of its members in particular. The first such statement was made in April 1999 by 
then-president Boris Yeltsin. In response to the NATO bombing of Serbia, Yeltsin issued the 
following official statement: 
“I told NATO, the Americans, the Germans: Don't push us towards military action. Otherwise, 
there will be a European war for sure, and possibly world war. (…) Our nuclear forces (…) 
remain a key element in the country's strategy for ensuring national security” (Yeltsin 1999). 
It then lasted quite some time until Russia made new nuclear threats against other states. In June 
2007, Russian president Vladimir Putin responded to the prospective deployment of US ballistic 
missile systems in Eastern Europe: 
“It is obvious that if part of the strategic nuclear potential of the United States is located 
in Europe, and according to our military experts will be threatening us, we will have to respond. 
(…) What kind of steps are we going to take in response? Of course, we are going to get new 
targets in Europe” (Putin, cited in Black 2010). 
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In 2008, high-ranking Russian general Anatoly Nogovitsyn responded to the potential 
deployment of NATO missiles in Eastern Europe as well, targeting Poland in particular: 
“By hosting these [missiles], Poland is making itself a target. This is 100 per cent certain. It 
becomes a target for attack. Such targets are destroyed as a first priority.” (Nogovitsyn, cited in 
Black 2010). 
Then, in 2012, the chief of the Russian general staff Nikolai Makarov stated: 
“We are certainly not planning to fight against the whole of NATO, but if there is a threat to 
the integrity of the Russian Federation, we have the right to use nuclear weapons, and we will.” 
(Makarov, cited in NTI 2012). 
Finally, in 2015, the Russian ambassador to Denmark, Mikhail Vanin threatened Denmark by 
publicly stating: 
 “I do not think that the Danes fully understand the consequences if Denmark joins the US-led 
missile defence shield. If that happens, Danish warships become targets for Russian nuclear 
missiles” (Vanin, cited in Withnall 2015). 
All in all, Russia made five distinct nuclear threats between 1993 and 2015. What strikes 
immediately is that four out of five nuclear threats were made between 2007 and 2015, 
signifying a large increase in the use of threatening nuclear rhetoric by Russian officials. 
4.4 Case Summary 
Russia’s nuclear weapons policy has changed continuously throughout the post-Cold War era, 
with the importance of nuclear weapons to its national security strategy shifting roughly every 
five years. Starting off in 1993, Russia established a relatively low nuclear threshold, embraced 
the decision to vastly decrease the strength (quality) and size (quantity) of its nuclear weapons 
arsenal and decided to refrain from making any nuclear threats for the next five years. In other 
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words, Russia considered nuclear weapons to be much less important to its national security 
strategy than during Soviet times. This lasted until roughly 1997. From 1997 until 2002, nuclear 
weapons became much more important to Russia’s national security strategy: Russia made one 
major nuclear threat, directed specifically against NATO. At the turn of the century, it 
significantly lowered its nuclear threshold – turning it into arguably the lowest nuclear threshold 
in the world. It furthermore decided to increase the strength of its nuclear weapons arsenal by 
means of modernization efforts.         
 Between 2003 and early 2008, nuclear weapons became less important to Russia’s 
national security strategy again: Russia made one nuclear threat and left its nuclear threshold 
as it was. It however decided to cut funding to its prime nuclear weapons modernization 
programmes, all the while the size of its nuclear arsenal continued to decline. Thus, the overall 
strength and size of its nuclear arsenal decreased. From 2008 until present, nuclear weapons 
became more important again to Russia: the country recommitted itself to its low nuclear 
threshold, and made three additional nuclear threats. Moreover, Russia decided to increase the 
strength and size of its nuclear arsenal. Reductions to its nuclear arsenal’s size were slowly 
brought to a standstill, resulting in the first overall increase in Russia’s active nuclear warhead 
inventory since the end of the Cold War to occur in 2015. The decreasing strength, or quality, 
of its nuclear launch capabilities was brought to a halt too. Russia since 2008 had revived its 
nuclear modernization efforts, resulting in the deployment of a new ICBM and SLBM. It 
additionally deployed upgraded versions of its strategic bombers, and started additional long-
term nuclear research and development programs. 
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5 Putting Expectations to the Test 
5.1 H1: Power Politics 
Now that we know the exact development of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold 
War era, we can turn our attention to assessing the predictions as posited by our theoretical 
models. First, let us look into the hypothesis posited by neorealism: 
H1: If Russia’s relative share of world power declines, it should decide to increase the strength 
and size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, to lower its threshold for using nuclear weapons and to 
make more nuclear threats versus other countries; as well as the other way around. 
In order to verify whether this expectation is met or not, one needs to know how Russia’s 
relative share of world power changed over time, particularly in the years leading up to 
important shifts in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. State power in international relations 
discourse is generally defined as a combination of both economic (latent) power and military 
power. Having said that, between 1993 and present, five alternating developments concerning 
Russia’s power position in the world can be distinguished.     
 Firstly, over the course of the 1990s, Russia’s relative share of world power increasingly 
declined. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy faltered into a deep 
depression. During the 1990s, Russia was in the process of implementing radical economic 
reforms, with the goal of turning the country’s centrally planned economy into a fully integrated 
market economy. These reforms, which included large-scale privatization efforts that were 
plagued by corruption, colloquially became known as economic ‘shock therapy’. And a shock 
it was. Between 1993 and 1999, real GDP in Russia – used by the IMF as a basic measure of 
economic power – had fallen by forty percent, reaching an all-time low in 1999. This happened 
in the wake of something even more extraordinary: just a year earlier, in 1998, the Russian 
government had defaulted on its debt. Subsequently, inflation had skyrocketed, as did the 
percentage of people living in poverty and the country’s level of economic inequality (World 
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Bank 2015). Not only Russia’s economic power, but also its military power diminished during 
the 1990s. In this period of time, the Russian military faced immense structural problems, owing 
to a general disorganized state of affairs due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Together with 
the aforementioned economic problems, this caused a rapid decline in the size and strength of 
Russia’s military. Russia decided to considerably reduce the size of its military forces: from 
just over two million in total military manpower in 1993 to just over one million in 2000 (De 
Haas 2011). The quality of the forces remaining was greatly reduced too: vast amounts of 
equipment and facilities were no longer being maintained or were simply abandoned, military 
training and education was lacking generally and living conditions in the Russian military were 
nothing short of miserable, both amongst professional and conscript forces (De Haas 2011). It 
prompted then-prime minister Vladimir Putin to proclaim the combat readiness of Russia’s 
military to be “critically low” (Traynor 2000).      
 The combined decline in military and economic power led to Russia in 1999, in terms 
of power, being worse off than in 1993. Compared to other states, Russia lost a great amount 
of power, and so too its relative share of world power increasingly declined between 1993 and 
1999. According to neorealism, this should be reflected in Russia’s decision-making 
surrounding nuclear weapons policy: Russia would be expected to adhere a more important role 
to nuclear weapons. From our case study, we can see that this is precisely what happened 
following Russia’s decline in power. In 2000, less than a year after Russia’s GDP hit record 
lows, Russia presented its new military doctrine, by which it significantly lowered its threshold 
for using nuclear weapons. The overall size of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal, as well as its 
strategic nuclear capabilities, diminished further after 1999. However, its strength increased, 
due to Russia’s initiation of modernization programs regarding its nuclear weapons arsenal and 
strategic launchers. Finally Russia, for the first time in the post-Cold War era, in 1997 made a 
distinct nuclear threat, directed specifically against NATO and its member states. `
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 Secondly, from 2000 until 2008, Russia’s economic power increased significantly, 
profiting in particular from rising commodity prices. Russia’s GDP grew extensively, 
exceeding growth rates of seven to eight percent. Poverty decreased sharply, and income 
inequality declined too, albeit slightly (World Bank 2015). Russia’s military strength however 
did not show similar improvements. The amount of Russian military personnel decreased with 
an additional 100,000 men between roughly 2000 and 2008. Its equipment remained to be in 
dreadful shape: between 2000 and 2004, the Russian military only received fifteen new tanks 
altogether – on a total number of 23,000 tanks (De Haas 2011). In around 2006, the share of 
modern military hardware was less than twenty percent of its total amount of military equipment 
(De Haas 2011). Altogether, Russia’s share of world power did increase between roughly 2000 
and 2008, albeit only in terms of its latent power: its rapid and vast economic recovery just 
outweighing the still worrisome condition of its military forces (Stent 2014).  
 The growth of Russia’s (economic) power is only modestly reflected in Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy. In the early 2000s, when Russia’s power was only just beginning to increase, 
Russia was still immersed in improving the strength of its strategic nuclear forces. It also had 
just published its new threshold for using nuclear weapons. However, as Russia’s (economic) 
power grew, so it diverted less attention to its nuclear weapons arsenal. Approximately halfway 
through the 2000s, at the time Russia’s post-Cold War economic development began to reach 
its height (World Bank 2015), Russia’s nuclear weapons modernization progress began to stall, 
as Russia increasingly diverted less resources towards its modernization programs. In the 
meantime, the Russian Federation continued to dismantle vast amounts of its (older) nuclear 
weapons stockpiles, as well as an increased amount of strategic launch systems. Thus, Russia’s 
nuclear strength in the period roughly between 2000 and 2010 increasingly began to fall. 
However, contrary to neorealism’s expectations, Russia did make two significant nuclear 
threats in this period of time: one against European members of NATO in general in June 2007, 
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and one specifically directed against Poland in August 2008. Additionally, Russia did not issue 
any changes to the role assigned to nuclear weapons in its nuclear doctrine, its nuclear threshold 
remaining to be low.          
 Thirdly, from 2008 until 2010, Russia’s overall power position declined again, mostly 
due to a decline in its latent power. This was brought about by a short but intense economic 
recession, which hit Russia from late 2008 until halfway through 2009. Owing to falling oil 
prices and concerns surrounding Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia over South-Ossetia, the 
Russian economy contracted by almost eight percent in 2009. GDP fell by four percent, and the 
Russian government had to invest heavily to revive its economy (World Bank 2015). Russia’s 
military power remained roughly the same between 2008 and 2010. The state of its equipment 
did not improve significantly, yet efforts were made in order to reorganize the Russian military. 
This military reform effort started in 2008, in order to address the Russian military’s 
weaknesses which came to light during the 2008 South-Ossetia war (Russel 2015). It involved 
significant reductions in the size of Russia’s military, in order to improve the military’s 
efficiency altogether (De Haas 2011). The reforms were completed in 2012, and only from then 
on could Russia reap the full organizational benefits of this reform (Russel 2015). 
 Russia’s declining relative share of world power between 2008 and 2010 is reflected in 
Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. In 2010, Russia reconfirmed its commitment to the world’s 
lowest nuclear threshold. From 2010 onwards, the strength of its nuclear arsenal increased, and 
its size no longer decreased: a first since the beginning of our case study. Additionally, Russia 
made one nuclear threat, in 2008.        
 Fourthly, from 2010 until early 2014, Russia’s power position increased significantly 
(Stent 2014). During this period, the Russia economy recovered from the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis. What is more, in 2011 and 2012 Russia’s GDP hit record heights (World Bank 2015). 
Also, from 2010 the strength of the Russian armed forces finally started to increase, mostly due 
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to improvements made to the military’s equipment, facilities and logistics (De Haas 2011). 
Also, as touched upon earlier, from 2012 the Russian military could benefit fully from the 
improvements to its organizational structure (Russel 2015).    
 The growth of Russia’s military and economic power between 2010 and 2014 has not 
been reflected in its nuclear weapons policy at all. The preceding developments associated with 
Russia’s policy only seem to continue between 2010 and 2014. During this period of time, 
Russia once more made a nuclear threat, and continued to adhere to its low nuclear threshold. 
Aditionally, the decline in the size and strength of its nuclear weapons arsenal slowly came to 
a hold, something which neorealism does not account for.     
 Fifthly and finally, after early 2014, Russia’s relative share of world power started to 
decline again. From that year, the Russian economy started to decline, amidst falling oil prices 
and the economic sanctions Russia received in the wake of its military involvement in Ukraine. 
These economic sanctions – imposed on Russia by primarily the United States and the EU 
following the Russian military intervention in Ukraine during 2014 and 2015 – have led to the 
depreciation of the Russian ruble (Oxenstierna 2015). Simultaneously, sharply falling oil prices 
have led to an increased fiscal deficit for the Russian government. The deprecation of the 
Russian ruble, brought about by the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, has created a 
capital flight from Russia, as international investors have been selling off their assets in Russia. 
Additionally, Russia’s international reserves have deteriorated, as has its GDP (Oxenstierna 
2015). Russia’s military strength has remained roughly the same since 2014. Although more 
extensive reform and modernization programs for the military as a whole are underway, these 
have not yet had a profound effect on the effectiveness of the Russian armed forces. 
 The decline in Russia’s power since 2014 has been reflected in Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy. Since 2014, Russia has made another distinct nuclear threat. It has, for the first 
time since the end of the Cold War, increased the size of its active nuclear weapons arsenal. 
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The strength (quality) of its nuclear arsenal too continued to increase, as more and more new 
nuclear launch systems came into service and new nuclear research and development projects 
were initiated.           
 From the foregoing, one can infer that some of neorealism’s expectations are met, while 
others are not. In particular, three notions stand out: 
1. As neorealism would expect, whenever Russia’s relative share of world power declined, 
it generally would ascribe more importance to its nuclear weapons: (re)committing itself 
to a low nuclear threshold, making nuclear threats and increasing the strength of its 
nuclear arsenal. 
2. Contrary to neorealism’s expectations, whenever Russia’s relative share of world power 
rose, this did not seem to have such a profound effect on the importance of its nuclear 
weapons to its national security strategy: True, the rate at which Russia was disbanding 
its nuclear arsenal increased as Russia’s power rose between 2000 and 2008. However, 
the making of nuclear threats continued and Russia’s threshold for using nuclear 
weapons did not decrease. The same goes for Russia’s rising power in the early 2010s, 
which has not been reflected by any changes in our three indicators at all. 
3. The size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal seems to move entirely independent from changes 
in Russian power. Increasing or decreasing power, the size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal 
continuously decreased throughout the post-Cold War era; with the exception of 2015. 
From these notions, we can infer that the neorealist hypothesis (H1) at best only partially 
explains the progression of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era. 
Neorealist thinking does much better in explaining why nuclear weapons would become more 
important to Russia’s national security strategy, than in explaining why these weapons would 
become less important to it. 
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5.2 H2 and H3: Interdependence and International Regimes 
For neoliberalism, two distinct hypotheses are put to the test: Firstly, H2 is tested:  
H2: The greater the extent of Russia’s economic dependence on other states, the more Russia 
should decide to decrease the strength and size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, to increase its 
threshold for using nuclear weapons and to make less nuclear threats versus other countries. 
To test this hypothesis, one must measure the extent of Russia’s economic interdependence 
throughout the post-Cold War era. This research makes use of two indicators of economic 
interdependence; the amount of international trade Russia is involved in and capital flows 
between Russia and other countries.         
 First we look at international trade. Between 1993 and 2000, Russian imports and 
exports were relatively low. The highest annual monthly import value rose from roughly 4 
billion USD in 1993 to around 7.4 billion USD in 1998. This occurred just before Russia’s 1998 
recession hit in full force, resulting in a significant drop in Russian imports and exports (Trading 
Economics 2015a, 2015b). The highest monthly export value grew from roughly 5 billion USD 
in 1993 to about 9 billion USD in 1998. After recovering from defaulting on its debt in 1998, 
between 2000 and 2008 Russian trade really took off. Exports and imports continuously rose 
throughout this time period, a development which accelerated over time. Russian imports grew, 
from achieving a peak monthly value of just under 4 billion USD in 2000 to achieving a top 
monthly value of 28 billion USD in 2008. Figures for Russian export show a similar pattern: 
between 2000 and 2008 Russian exports grew from a highest monthly value of 9.5 billion USD 
to a top monthly value of 47 billion USD (Trading Economics 2015a, 2015b). However, again 
Russia was hit by an economic crisis, and again trade faltered: In 2009, Russian exports were 
not even half those of 2008, amounting to approximately 18 billion USD monthly. Imports fell 
to just under 10 billion USD monthly. As the Russian economy as a whole recovered quickly 
from the 2008 recession, so did Russia’s international trade, with exports and imports reaching 
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all-time highs in December 2011 (respectively 50.2 billion and 30.2 billion USD) and 
December 2013 (50 billion USD and 33 billion USD) (Trading Economics 2015a, 2015b). 
Finally, in the wake of economic sanctions by Western countries, Russia in 2015 witnessed 
significant drops in its exports and imports. The highest monthly import value that year 
amounted to a mere 12.5 billion USD, whereas the highest monthly import value for 2015 
compared to 2014 decreased to 25 billion USD (Trading Economics 2015a, 2015b). 
 Then, let us turn to the development of international capital flows between Russia and 
the rest of the world. Figures related to Russia’s international monetary flows are available from 
2005 onwards. From the beginning of 2005 until the end of 2014, Russia on an annual basis 
had a negative capital flow. This means that more money was moving from Russia (with the 
purpose of investment, production or trade) than flowing towards it. This is not necessarily a 
negative thing: it shows Russia’s commitment to international trade, as well as its capability to 
spend a lot of financial resources on foreign investment and foreign production. The flow of 
capital from Russia almost continuously increased between 2005 and 2014, with the exception 
of 2013. Russian investors, in other words, began investing more money abroad than ever 
before (Trading Economics 2015c). In 2015, Russia for the first time since 2005 had an overall 
financial account surplus (Trading Economics 2015c). This occurred mainly due to the 
economic sanctions imposed by Western states on Russia, as these sanctions resulted in a more 
careful spending approach by the Russian central bank, as well as lower confidence amongst 
Russian private investors (Oxenstierna 2015).      
 Taken together, both indicators show that Russia’s level of economic interdependence 
has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War. When exempting the time periods 
surrounding Russia’s 1998 financial crisis, its 2009/2009 recession and its 2014-2015 economic 
crisis as outliers, the amount of Russian imports and exports increasingly grew throughout the 
post-Cold War era. Likewise, from 2005 until 2014 Russia had a continuously increasing 
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negative capital flow. Russian investors annually spend more money abroad than ever before. 
In other words, our indicators show that Russia’s economic interdependence has continuously 
– and progressively more – increased between 1993 and 2014. It was only during 2015 that the 
extent to which Russia was economically interdependent decreased again.   
 The question then is whether Russia’s nuclear weapons policy is consistent with this 
observation in a way neoliberalists would expect it to be. In brief, this is not the case. Although 
the total size of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal continuously declined between 1993 and 
2014, in line with Russia’s increasing level of economic interdependence, there are other parts 
of said policy which our second hypothesis does not account for. While Russia’s degree of 
economic interdependence has continuously increased, Russia in the meantime has not 
increased its threshold for using nuclear weapons. Neither has it made any less nuclear threats 
against other states. In fact, three of the five nuclear threats Russia made in the post-Cold War 
era took place between 2007 and 2014, when Russia’s economic interdependence was booming. 
Finally, Russia’s rising level of economic interdependence does not explain the increase in 
strength of Russia’s nuclear arsenal taking place from 2015. 
Secondly, we turn to our assessment of H3:  
H3: As Russia’s envelopment in the international nuclear regime becomes more extensive, the 
strength and size of its nuclear weapons arsenal should decrease, its threshold for using nuclear 
weapons should increase and the less it should make nuclear threats versus other states. 
In order to test this hypothesis this research analyzes the Russian involvement in – and 
adherence to – nuclear arms reduction treaties from the end of the Cold War. As stated earlier, 
only if Russia would have truly adhered to these treaties, a significant effect on Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy is to be expected. Four significant treaties considering nuclear arms reductions 
and arms restrictions are looked into. Three of these (START I, SORT and the New START 
treaty) are bilateral strategic arms reductions treaties signed between the US and Russia. The 
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fourth treaty under examination is the multilateral CTBT.     
 First, we turn to Russia’s adherence to the START I treaty. START I, the first treaty to 
provide for a deep reduction in the US and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, was signed in 
July 1991, between the Soviet Union and the US. Less than half a year later the Soviet Union 
dissolved and Russia, together with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan became members to the 
treaty instead. The treaty entered into force on December 5th 1994, and expired December 5th 
2009 (NTI 2015b). For Russia and the US, the treaty established an aggregate limit of:  
 1,600 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers 
 6,000 deployed  active warheads (fully operational warheads, available for immediate 
use) (NTI 2015b) 
These limits had to be attained within seven years of the treaty entering into force. Warheads 
removed from deployed service were to be dismantled and subsequently destroyed. 
Additionally, START I contains extensive verification and transparency provisions. Through 
data sharing, on-site inspections and monitoring missions, both states were permitted to check 
one another’s compliance with the treaty (NTI 2015b).      
 On December 5th 2001, seven years after START I entered into force, the United States 
and Russia jointly announced that both parties had fulfilled their obligations under START I. 
Specifically, Russia stated that it had reduced its deployed strategic delivery vehicles to a total 
of 1136, with 5518 warheads in total connected to them, statistics which were subsequently 
verified by the United States (NTI 2015b). According to a 2010 report by the US Department 
of State, Russia between December 2001 and December 2009 consistently lived up to the limits 
set under START I. The report however did raise a number of concerns over Russia’s 
compliance with the treaty when it came to verification (US Department of State 2010). An 
issue highlighted in the report was the regular Russian practice of temporarily removing road-
mobile ICBM launchers from a nuclear production facility at Volgograd ahead of US 
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inspections. As revealed by US satellite footage, these systems, would return to the facility only 
following US. Nevertheless, even accounting for such practices, Russia still adhered to the 
limits set under START I inspections (US Department of State 2010). This corresponds to the 
estimates regarding Russian strategic launchers used earlier in this research. All in all, Russia 
thus complied with the obligations set under the START I treaty.    
 Secondly, we examine Russia’s compliance with the CTBT, as adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1996. The CTBT is a multilateral treaty, by which states party to it agree 
on a total ban on nuclear explosions, both for civilian and military purposes. Although the 
CTBT has not yet entered into force (due to a number of particular states not having ratified the 
treaty), states can de facto comply with the CTBT, by adhering to its main principles: 
 Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any 
other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any 
place under its jurisdiction or control. 
 Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in 
any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any 
other nuclear explosion (CTBTO 1996). 
Russia, having signed and ratified the treaty, has up until now fully obliged to these provisions.
 Thirdly, Russia’s compliance with SORT is examined. Russia and the US signed SORT 
in 2002, aiming to further reduce the sizes of their respective nuclear arsenals. Under SORT, 
which entered into force in 2003, it was mandated that both Russia and the US would further 
reduce their respective number of deployed nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 
December 31st 2012. SORT however lacked provisions regarding verification and compliance, 
relying solely on the START I provisions regarding these matters. Furthermore, arsenal 
reductions made under SORT’s premises were not mandatory to be permanent. Russia or the 
US could thus theoretically place weapons in storage, only to redeploy them later on (NTI 
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2011). Thus, one can only attempt to verify whether or not Russia complied with the SORT 
treaty by looking – again – into estimates regarding Russia’s arsenal of nuclear warheads. 
Kristensen and Norris in 2012 estimated the total amount of nuclear warheads operationally 
deployed by Russia to be, at minimum, 2,430 (Kristensen 2012). Using this number as a 
reference, it becomes clear that Russia did not abide to the rules laid out under SORT. 
 Fourthly, the assessment of Russia’s obedience to New START. This treaty, which 
entered into force on February 5th 2011, replaces the SORT treaty. It establishes the following 
limits to the deployed active nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States, limits which need 
to be achieved before February 5th 2018: 
  700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers 
 1,550 deployed  active warheads (fully operational warheads, available for immediate 
use) (NTI 2015b)  
Russia’s compliance with New START cannot yet be measured in full, as the deadline for 
reaching the targets above has not yet passed. However, one can assess whether or not Russia 
is moving towards reaching the limits specified under New START. As mentioned earlier, in 
2012 Russia was estimated to have a minimum of 2,430 operationally deployed warheads. In 
2015, this number had dropped to 1,780. Additionally, the total amount of strategic launchers 
Russia deploys has been under 700 already since 2007 (Natural Resources Defense Council 
2015). However, Russia is in the process of developing new nuclear weapons, as well as launch 
systems capable of carrying more nuclear warheads than any of Russia’s current strategic 
launchers. Also, when compared to 2014, Russia had approximately 200 more warheads in 
active service (both deployed and in storage) than in 2014. Such notions raise questions 
surrounding Russia’s commitment to the obligations laid out under New START (Kristensen 
2015). So, despite Russia moving towards the limits set under New START, recent 
developments have cast a shadow over its decline in nuclear warheads and launch systems.
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 Russia has thus complied fully with the nuclear treaties it signed during the 1990s 
(START I, CTBT), yet has not (yet) complied with the treaties it signed following 2000 (SORT, 
New START). As Russia’s envelopment in the nuclear regime has risen over time (as it became 
member to more of the regime’s treaties), neoliberalism would expect that nuclear weapons 
would become less important to Russia’s security strategy. This however has not been the case 
continuously since 1993. Only the size of Russia’s active nuclear arsenal continuously declined 
since 1993 (with the exception of 2015). The other factors however show changing results, 
inconsistent with Russia’s increasing envelopment in the international nuclear regime.  
 The neoliberal expectations give us two comparable results: apart from correlating with 
the quantity of Russia’s active nuclear arsenal and strategic launch systems, it can be inferred 
that economic interdependence and Russia’s envelopment in the international nuclear regime 
do not have a distinguishable effect on Russian nuclear weapons policy as a whole. Changes in 
the quality of the Russian arsenal, in the amount of nuclear threats made by its officials and 
changes to its nuclear threshold do not follow the developments taking place in terms of 
economic interdependence and Russia’s envelopment in the international nuclear regime. 
5.3 H4 and H5: Norms and Perception 
After examining the hypotheses posited by neorealism and neoliberalism, it is time to turn our 
attention to those suggested by constructivism. First, we examine the idea concerning normative 
influence on Russian nuclear weapons policy: 
H4: If certain norms, such as the non-use of nuclear weapons, become more predominant in the 
Russian society, said development should be reflected in Russia’s decision-making surrounding 
its nuclear weapons policy. 
As stipulated earlier, the influence of norms on state behavior when it comes to nuclear weapons 
can be extensive. When it comes to testing the above hypothesis, it is first necessary to know 
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which norms surrounding nuclear weapons are prevalent in Russia. For that, we have to turn to 
research surrounding public opinion in Russia concerning nuclear weapons.  
 There has not been much statistical research surrounding nuclear weapons in Russia and 
its general public’s opinion regarding these weapons. Two major studies exist, one undertaken 
in 2000, and one undertaken in 2007. The 2000 survey was undertaken by an independent 
Russian polling company employed by the Russian PIR Center (Center for Policy Studies in 
Russia), questioning a total of 1,500 people in 56 locations throughout the Russian Federation 
(Orlov 2000). The survey found the following sentiments related to nuclear weapons amongst 
the survey respondents: 
 76 percent of Russians believed the world would become less stable if more countries 
had nuclear weapons. 
 55 percent of the Russian general public was in favor of the reductions proposed under 
START-II; 25 percent was against.3 
 Only 8 percent of Russians supported a buildup of Russian strategic nuclear forces, in 
response to the US building a national missile defense system. 
 At the same time, 76 percent of respondents supported the phrase that for Russia 
“nuclear weapons play a vital role in providing national security” (Orlov 2000). 
 32 percent of Russians felt that Russia should have as many nuclear weapons as the US; 
26 percent even supported the idea of Russia possessing more nuclear weapons than its 
former Cold War adversary (Orlov 2000). 
From the above, we can take that Russians in 2000 generally valued the idea of nonproliferation, 
yet also deemed nuclear weapons necessary in providing for Russia’s national security. At the 
                                                          
3 The Russian Duma ratified START-II in April 2000. However, following the US withdrawal from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, Russia withdrew from START II, leading to the latter never entering into force. 
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same time, the idea of Russia obtaining more nuclear weapons was met with widespread 
aversion amongst Russian citizens, in particular amongst senior citizens (Orlov 2000). 
The 2007 survey was undertaken by the University of Maryland’s Center for 
International and Security Studies (CISSM), and fielded by the Moscow-based Levada Center. 
It was conducted with a nationwide sample of 1,601 respondents (Kull et al. 2007). The 
following notions came to light following the survey: 
 65 percent of respondents approved of the US-Russian agreement to reduce their active 
nuclear weapons arsenal under SORT-mandated limits (2000 in total). 
 58 percent of Russians would favor reducing the active nuclear stockpiles of both the 
US and Russia to a number significantly lower than 2000. 
 53 percent of the respondents would agree to cutting Russian and US nuclear stockpiles 
to 400 active nuclear warheads. 
 67 percent of Russians supports the idea that eventually all nuclear weapons should be 
eliminated, as stipulated in the NPT (Kull et al. 2007). 
As in 2000, Russians in 2007 valued the nonproliferation regime, as can be derived from their 
general support of the NPT. The other interesting finding is that most Russians in 2007 were in 
favor of (deep) reductions to the Russian active nuclear arsenal, even more so than in 2000. It 
must be noted here that the vast majority of respondents in favor of such deep reductions would 
only be in favor of said decline if the US arsenal was set to decline under the same limits as set 
for the Russian arsenal (Kull et al. 2007).       
 From the foregoing, one can infer that the majority of the Russian public adheres to one 
major norm surrounding nuclear weapons in Russia. Almost two-thirds of the Russian public 
supports diminishing the total amount of active Russian nuclear warheads. Likewise, two-thirds 
of the Russian public is in favor of the idea that eventually all nuclear weapons should be 
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eliminated. Russians generally speaking were thus more in favor of deep nuclear arms 
reductions (provided the US nuclear stockpile’s quantity goes down with that of Russia) in 2007 
than they were in 2000. The question then is whether or not this norm has been reflected in 
Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. In short, this has not been the case. The Russian active nuclear 
stockpile currently stands at 4,500 nuclear warheads, while in 2007 this number stood at almost 
6,300. While this is a lot less than the more than 40,000 nuclear warheads the Soviet Union 
once had in stock, this is also more than twice that of SORT-mandated limits. Deep reductions 
in the Russian nuclear stockpile cannot be seen, and thus the norm is not reflected in Russia’s 
nuclear weapons policy.         
 Second, we assess the proposition surrounding Russia’s perception of the US: 
H5: If Russia’s perception of the United States changes for the better, a decrease in the strength 
and size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, an increase in its threshold for using nuclear weapons 
and a decrease in the making of nuclear threats against other countries should follow 
accordingly. 
Russia in its official policy documents from time to time refers to other states as a threat to its 
national security. This implies the potential construction of the US by Russia as a threat, as 
being Russia’s main nuclear adversary. In order to test our final hypothesis, this research again 
turns to public opinion polls, this time regarding public perception in Russia of the United 
States. Research carried out by the Levada Center in collaboration with Pew Research Center 
shows that the general perception of the US in Russia has changed thoroughly throughout the 
post-Cold War era, experiencing some sharp dips through time and generally declining ever 
since Russia adopted its constitution in 1993. Figure 5 shows the development of Russian public 
opinion of the United States over time during the post-Cold War era. 
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Figure 5 clearly shows how public opinion in Russia regarding the United States has been 
subject to the major geopolitical events surrounding Russia. In 1999, the first major dip in 
Russian public perception of the US, the US was involved in the Kosovo War; a conflict taking 
place right at the ‘doorstep’ to Russia. The September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 helped 
improve the opinion of Russian of the US. The 2003 invasion of Iraq had a negative impact on 
public opinion, as did the US reaction to Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia. Following 2008, 
general perception increased again; only to reach an all-time low in early 2015 of 13 percent 
(Pew Research Center).         
 Now, to what extent does the development of Russia’s general perception of the United 
States match changes in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy? Two major depressions in Russia’s 
perception of the United States align with changes in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy: the one 
taking place in 1999, and the one taking place in 2008. Following both depressions, nuclear 
weapons became significantly more important to Russia’s national security strategy. However, 
the improvement of Russia’s perception of the US did not yield any significant effect on 
Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. Following periods of better public opinion of the US, there 
Source: Washington Post 2015; Pew Research Center 2015 
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were no significant changes made to Russia’s nuclear weapons policy that made nuclear 
weapons less important to its national security strategy. 
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
6.1 Summary and Alternative Explanations 
This thesis sought to resolve which one of three international relations theories – neorealism, 
neoliberalism or social constructivism – best explains the development of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy during the post-Cold War era. The research carried out first examined the 
specific way each theory would predict how a country makes decisions surrounding its nuclear 
weapons policy, leading to the establishment of five hypotheses. Second, this research 
examined the progression of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era. By 
looking into the quality and quantity (strength and size) of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal, 
the development of its nuclear threshold and the making of nuclear threats by Russian 
government officials, it was first established that Russia’s nuclear weapons policy indeed 
changed over the post-Cold War era. This thesis then turned to testing the hypotheses posited 
earlier. Having done so, it has become clear that no one hypothesis fully holds against the 
evidence provided by the Russian case. Thus, no one theory of international relations can fully 
explain the direction of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy as a whole.    
 Some elements of change in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy can be explained in some 
instances, yet not all changes can be explained by one hypothesis alone.  Neorealism’s 
expectation applies in one direction: its explanation of why a country would ascribe more 
importance to its nuclear weapons closely follows the Russian case. However, neorealism does 
not account for a decrease in the importance ascribed by Russia to its nuclear weapons. As for 
neoliberalism, while rising economic interdependence and an increased Russian involvement 
in the international nuclear regime match with the continuous decline in the size of Russia’s 
nuclear stockpile, they cannot explain Russian nuclear weapons policy as a whole. The quality 
   
51 
 
of Russia’s arsenal, its nuclear threshold and the making of nuclear threats by its government 
officials all change independently from both Russia’s involvement in the nuclear regime and 
Russia’s degree of interdependence. Finally, when looking at the hypotheses posited by social 
constructivism, it becomes clear that these too do not hold. The norm prevalent in Russian 
society, the idea of commencing deep reductions to the Russian arsenal’s size, has not been 
reflected fully in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy. Furthermore, changes in the Russian 
perception of the United States do not add up to changes in the Russian nuclear weapons policy.
 All in all, this thesis argues that, when sticking to the application of international 
relations theory, the best way to explain the development of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy 
is to combine insights from both neorealism and neoliberalism. In doing so, one can, trough 
neorealism, explain why nuclear weapons become more significant to Russia’s national security 
strategy. Additionally, through neoliberalism, one can explain developments regarding the size 
of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. One should keep in mind that such an approach is far from flawless. 
Primarily it does not account for reductions in the importance ascribed to nuclear weapons by 
Russia.            
 A major challenge encountered in this research is that there happened to be significant 
overlap between factors which, according to our differing hypotheses, could potentially 
influence Russian nuclear weapons policy. For example, economic decline (and thus loss of 
power) for Russia often coincided with a drop in positive public perception of the US. This 
research has attempted to differentiate as much as possible between the different explanations, 
offering as much insight in Russian nuclear weapons policy decision-making as possible.
 This research has focused exclusively on the utility of international relations theory in 
explaining Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era. However, as we found 
that no one theory of international relations can fully explain the direction of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy as a whole, additional research should be undertaken. This future research then 
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should focus on exploring alternative explanations for the progression of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy, explanations which due to their nature lie beyond the scope of this research. 
 One alternative explanation might revolve around (Russian) economics. From this 
research itself, it already becomes clear that most changes in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy 
have occurred in the time periods directly following the three financial crises that hit the country 
in the post-Cold War era. Around 2000, just after Russia had defaulted on its debt, Russia 
lowered its nuclear threshold and decided to invest in the quality of its nuclear arsenal. 
Following the 2008/2009 crisis, Russia recommitted itself to this threshold, and once again 
pledged to modernize its nuclear arsenal. And, in light of the 2014/2015 economic recession, 
Russia for the first time in the post-Cold War era increased the size of its active nuclear weapons 
arsenal.           
 A second potential factor of influence on Russian nuclear weapons policy is the person 
in office as the Russian president. The personal preferences and views of a state leader can have 
tremendous effects on the way he or she acts regarding certain fields of government. Elite 
thinking about policymaking in all fields can be highly influenced by a nation’s state leader.
 A third potential explanation is that the importance of nuclear weapons to Russia’s 
national security strategy is based solely on a risk-assessment of US or NATO conventional 
and nuclear forces vis-à-vis the Russian military. As the Russian military currently lacks the 
conventional means to withstand an assault by NATO forces, it could be possible that Russia, 
in response to what it perceives as NATO conventional threats, has turned to adhering more 
significance to nuclear weapons during specific moments in the post-Cold War era. 
Furthermore, it could be that Russia simply adheres to its nuclear weapons because the United 
States does so too. Of course, whether this or any of the other alternative explanations touched 
upon here hold is something for future research to uncover. 
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6.2 Conclusion 
This research looked into the particular development of Russian nuclear weapons policy in the 
post-Cold War era. Specifically, it sought to answer to what extent three leading theories of 
International Relations – neorealism, neoliberalism and social constructivism – are capable of 
explaining the development of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era. 
It first established that said policy has shifted a number of times from its inception in 
1993: Russia in 2000 significantly lowered its nuclear threshold, turning it into arguably the 
lowest in the world: a margin which continues to stand up until today. Between 1993 and 2014 
the total size of Russia’s nuclear warhead inventory declined, albeit towards the end at a 
declining rate. In 2015, Russia’s aggregate nuclear inventory for the first time in the post-Cold 
War era increased. The strength of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is a different story. Two times since 
the end of the Cold War has Russia vowed to implement nuclear modernization programs. The 
modernization effort expressed by the Russian government in the early 2000s was effective 
only in the beginning; after a few years the Russian commitment to modernizing its nuclear 
arsenal faded. The modernization effort to which the Russian government pledged itself in 2008 
has been more effective overall, as the quality of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal has 
increased significantly since that year. Additionally, Russia’s strategic warhead loading 
capacity, while continuously decreasing up until 2010, has roughly remained stable ever-since 
that same year. Finally, the use of nuclear threats by Russian government officials has risen 
substantially over the post-Cold War era. Since 1993, Russia has issued five distinct nuclear 
threats against another state: once in 1999, and the last four all since 2007 (2007, 2008, 2012 
and 2015).            
 Our theories’ expectations all fail to completely explain Russia’s nuclear weapons 
policy. The hypothesis stemming from neorealism is of use in explaining why Russia has 
ascribed more importance to nuclear weapons at certain points in time since the end of the Cold 
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War. It however fails to account for those times when Russia decided to decrease the importance 
it ascribed to nuclear weapons for its national security strategy. Neoliberalism’s expectations 
match the continuous decline in the quantity of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Interdependence and 
Russia’s involvement in the international nuclear regime however do not account for changes 
in the quality of the Russian arsenal, changes in the amount of nuclear threats made by Russian 
officials or changes in the Russian nuclear threshold. The hypotheses posited by constructivism 
similarly do not hold. Amongst the Russian general public, there exists widespread support for 
much further reductions in Russian nuclear arsenal size than have been implemented so far, an 
idea which up until now has not been applied in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy (or expressed 
in Russian policy documents). Likewise, Russia’s perception of the United States has no 
identifiable influence on Russia’s nuclear weapons policy.     
 While none of the three theories’ expectations are fully met, this research concludes by 
asserting that Russian nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era can best be explained 
by combining insights from the neorealist and neoliberal school of thought. Changes in Russia’s 
power position can account for Russia adhering more importance to nuclear weapons, while 
Russia’s involvement in the international nuclear regime, as well as increasing interdependency 
can account for the reductions in size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, as these are the only two 
factors matching the development of the quantity of Russia’s nuclear weapon arsenal in the 
post-Cold War era. 
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